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Abstract
In this paper we propose a novel explanation for the increase in households’ leverage
during the recent boom in U.S. housing prices. We use the U.S. housing market’s boom-
bust episode that led to the Great Recession as a case study, and we show that biased
long-run expectations of both households and, especially, financial intermediaries about
future housing prices had a large impact on households’ indebtedness. Specifically, first
we show that it is likely that financial intermediaries used forecasting models that ignored
the long-run mean reversion of housing prices after a short-run momentum, thus leading
to an overestimation of future households’ housing wealth. We frame this finding in the
theory of natural expectations, proposed by Fuster et al. (2010), to the housing market.
Then, using a tractable model of collateralized credit market populated by households
and banks, we find that: (1) mild variations in long-run forecasts of housing prices result
in quantitatively considerable differences in the amount of home equity extracted during
a housing price boom; (2) the equilibrium levels of debt and interest rate are particularly
sensitive to financial intermediaries’ naturalness; (3) home equity extraction data are
better matched by models in which agents are fairly natural.
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1 Introduction
From 1999 to the end of 2006, U.S. household debt relative to income grew sharply,
from 64 percent to more than 100 percent.1 The increase in debt was accompanied by a
sharp appreciation in housing prices: the real house price Standard & Poor’s Case-Shiller
Home Price Index soared by 65 per cent in the same time span. Unlike previous episodes of
heated housing markets, the recent housing price boom has been characterized by a surge in
households’ extraction of home equity, through cash-out refinancing of mortgages, second lien
home equity loans, or home equity lines of credit (henceforth, HELOCs). In 1990, the value
of these home equity extraction instruments recorded in the balance sheet of U.S. commercial
banks was about $58 billion; at the end of 1999, their value doubled to $103 billion; and in
2006, when housing prices were at their peak, it had more than quadrupled.2 Also, Greenspan
and Kennedy (2005) document that households’ gross home equity extraction as a fraction
of disposable income increased by 7 percentage points (from less than 3 percent to about 10
percent) between 1997 and 2005.
In this paper we propose a novel explanation for the increase in households’ leverage
during a housing price boom. We show that long-run expectations about future house prices
of both households and, especially, financial intermediaries have a large impact on households’
indebtedness. Our story relates to the work of Fuster et al. (2010) and Fuster et al. (2012)
and the concept of natural expectations as follows. In their setting: (1) fundamentals of the
economy are truly hump-shaped, exhibiting momentum in the short run and partial mean
reversion in the long run, which, however, is hard to identify in small samples. And (2)
agents do not know that fundamentals are hump-shaped and, instead, base their beliefs on
parsimonious models that fit the available data.3 Following a similar approach, we assume
that our economy’s homeowners, taking housing prices as given, have to forecast house price
realizations to quantify their future housing wealth and to decide how much equity to extract.
Similarly, financial intermediaries need to forecast future house prices to choose the supply
of home equity loans. Which model do agents use to forecast housing prices? We consider
a set of parsimonious models that replicate empirically observed patterns in housing prices.
Hence, these models are similar in terms of in-sample fit and short-run forecasts. However,
they differ in their ability to capture the long-run hump-shaped dynamics that characterize
1Source: US. Bureau of Economic Analysis (GDP, BEA Account Code: A191RC1) and Federal Re-
serve System, Flow of Funds (Households and nonprofit organizations; total mortgages; liability, id:
Z1/Z1/FL153165005.Q).
2Source: Federal Reserve System, Flow of Funds.
3These assumptions are able to generate empirically observed patterns in asset prices, such as asset price
volatility, mean-reversion, and large equity premium.
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housing prices. We are interested in assessing how the behavior of agents in the credit market
is affected by natural expectations - that is, by using simplified models that fail to take into
account the long-run mean reversion of house prices after a positive short-run momentum
when making forecasts.4 After all, as shown by Fuster et al. (2010), long-run mean reversion
is a property of a process that is hard to detect in small samples. Then, using a tractable
model of a collateralized credit market populated by households and banks and calibrated
to the most recent house price boom, we find that: (1) mild variations in long-run housing
price forecasts result in quantitatively considerable differences in the amount of home equity
extracted during a housing price boom; (2) the equilibrium level of debt and its interest rate
are particularly sensitive to financial intermediaries’ naturalness ; (3) home equity extraction
data are better matched by models in which agents are fairly natural. Our findings, hence,
support the theory of Case et al. (2012), which highlights the role of future housing price
expectations among other several explanations of market dynamics.5 6
We believe that the documenting and quantifying the relevance of the expectation channel
is relevant in the recent financial world, specifically because the availability of new financial
instruments allows agents to borrow today against their future expected value of their houses.
Obviously, the existence of these financial instruments is a necessary condition for creating
a link between subjectively perceived future housing wealth and current economic decisions.
In other words, if agents were to overestimate future house prices in a time where housing
wealth was illiquid, those bias expectations would not be able to drastically affect borrowing
decisions. We believe and we attempt to document that the interaction between availability of
collateralized debt and natural expectations on future house prices was likely a major player
in the surge of households’ leverage during the recent house price boom.
The assumption that households behave in line with natural expectations when confronting
house prices is largely supported by empirical work. For example, Goodman and Ittner (1992)
surveys the early literature about the excessive optimism of homeowners in assessing the fu-
ture values of their homes and documents that households overestimate home price by between
4 percent and 16 percent. Even more drastically, homeowners appear to significantly overes-
4As in Fuster et al. (2010), for tractability we abstract from learning and give agents a fixed, simple model
estimated using available data.
5In this respect, our paper is also in line with Burnside et al. (2011), which show that boom and bust
dynamics in the housing market are affected by “social dynamics” that lead agents to change beliefs about
future housing prices
6Other theories proposed in the literature focus on: growing complacency of lenders in the face of declining
loan quality (Mian and Sufi, 2011, Demyanyk and Van Hemert, 2011); money illusion on the part of homebuyers
that led to flawed comparisons of home purchase prices with rents (Brunnermeier and Julliard, 2008); an
agency problem aﬄicting the credit rating agencies (Mathis et al., 2009); and government failure to regulate
an emerging shadow banking system (Gorton, 2010).
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timate the current value of their houses: Agarwal (2007) considers panel data from 2002 to
2005 and concludes that homeowners overestimate their house value by on average 3.1 per-
cent. Also, using questionnaire survey data in the period 2002-2012, Case et al. (2012) find
that households’ forecasts were accurate in the short-run (one year) but “abnormally high” in
the long run (10 years).7 Nevertheless, households are only one side of the housing-related
debt market. In fact, financial institutions supply credit to households and, if they did not
share the same optimistic forecasts, they would be reluctant to provide home equity at low
interest rates. One novelty of this paper is its insight in documenting that financial experts
also fell victim to natural expectations when they made their housing price forecasts - in
the sense that they, too, ignored any form of long-run mean reversion in housing prices after
the positive and strong short-run momentum. In addition, using our model, we highlight
that banks’ natural expectations were particularly important for the recent home equity ex-
traction boom. Specifically, the equilibrium level of debt in the economy owes more to the
natural expectations of financial intermediaries than of households. The natural expectations
of financial intermediaries seems a necessary component in any explanation of the reduction
of the interest rate for home equity loans as observed during the housing price boom. Yet,
surprisingly, investigations of the role of the supply side on the surge of housing-related debt
is a relatively unexplored issue. An exception is Justiniano et al. (2014), who, however, focus
on the loosening of lending constraints in the mortgage markets.
Thus, the first contribution of our paper is to document that financial experts also likely
ignored hump-shaped dynamics of housing prices in their forecasts, and thus wound up being
excessively optimistic about long-run housing price appreciation in the recent price boom.
Specifically, we gather a unique dataset of out-of-sample housing price forecasts made by a
professional forecasting company in the period 1995-2011 and show that these forecasts do
not display any sort of adjustment after a period of short-run positive momentum: forecasts
made prior to 2006 predict overall constant and large increases in long-run housing price until
2030. These findings are in line with other studies about the behavior of housing market
experts during the boom phase.8 We argue, then, that financial experts can also be treated
as natural agents and that their inability to account for hump-shaped housing price dynamics
affected the supply of credit during the recent boom.
As a second contribution of the paper, we apply the theory of natural expectations to the
housing market. Specifically, first we show that housing prices are characterized by hump-
7As the authors state: “it may be a general expectation about the vague and distant future that helps
explain why people behaved in the 2000s as if they thought that home prices could never fall: perhaps they
thought so only about the long run, as our 10-year expectations data seem to confirm”.
8See Foote et al. (2012) and Cheng et al. (2014).
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shaped dynamics, which imply a large momentum in the short run and partial mean reversion
in the long run. Then, we compare four models to estimate and forecast housing price dy-
namics. We consider two possible dimensions that lead to natural expectations: (1) an inner
tendency of agents to incorporate a small set of explanatory variables when estimating a
model, in line with the findings in Beshears et al. (2013); and (2) a limited ability of agents
to consider a large set of data when estimating the model, in line with the assumption of
extrapolative expectations applied to the housing market.9 We also consider two rigorous and
more sophisticated statistical approaches to modeling and forecasting housing prices, which
differ in the information criterion used to select the most appropriate specification. We find
that models that incorporate hump-shaped dynamics are not preferred, in terms of in-sample
fit, to more parsimonious models that ignore long-run mean reversion. As a result, the use of
simple models leading to natural beliefs is fully justifiable in terms of in-sample performance.
Finally, we demonstrate that models that have diverse degrees of ability to capture hump-
shaped dynamics in housing price market may differ in their long-run forecasts, while leading
to similar short-run predictions. Hence, agents that make use of simple models fail to take
into account the partial mean reversion of housing prices in the long run.10
The third contribution of the paper is to link long-run housing price forecasts to the
optimal behavior of agents in the credit market. We therefore introduce a tractable model
of a collateralized credit market populated by a representative household and bank. The
household can obtain credit from the bank by pledging its house as collateral.11 In each
period, the household decides how much to consume and how much to borrow and, given the
realization of the stochastic exogenous housing price, whether to repay its debt or to default
and lose the ownership of the house. The amount of debt demanded crucially depends on the
expected realizations of the housing price. The bank borrows resources at a prime rate and
lends them to the household charging a margin. The bank gains either from debt repayment,
in the case of no default from the household, or from the sale of the housing stock, in the
case of default. Hence, the bank faces a trade-off when offering a large amount of debt: on
the one hand, it might increase its revenue in case of no-default; on the other, it provides
incentives to the household to default. Obviously, the banks’ expected future house price is a
key determinant of its supply of credit.
In our quantitative assessment, we are mainly interested in examining the extent to which
9See Goetzmann et al. (2012), Abraham and Hendershott (1994), Muellbauer and Murphy (1997) and
Piazzesi and Schneider (2009).
10As discussed in Fuster et al. (2010): “there are several reasons that justify the use of simple models: they
are easy to understand, easy to explain, and easy to employ; simplicity also reduces the risks of over-fitting”.
11The model is related to Cocco (2005), Yao (2005), Li and Yao (2007), Campbell and Cocco (2011), and
Brueckner et al. (2012).
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the equilibrium level of debt and its price vary with the ability of agents to take into account
possible long run mean-reverting dynamics of housing prices. Hence, we select a housing price
path in our model that matches the observed dynamics of the aggregate U.S. housing price in
the period 2001-2010, and we vary the specification of the process the agents use to predict
future house prices. We consider a large set of specifications (fifty) that are identical in terms
of the short-run (one-year ahead) forecast, and in terms of magnitude of the unconditional
variance of the housing price process, but that differ in terms of the long-run expectations.
Hence, we can rank the different specifications according to their degree of naturalness : more
natural processes ignore the long-run mean reversion of housing prices and predict a higher
long-run price; less natural processes incorporate a certain degree of housing price adjustment
after the short-run momentum and predict a lower long-run price. We find four results.
First, the model predicts a positive relationship between the average equilibrium level of
debt in the economy in the boom phase and the degree of naturalness of agents. Intuitively,
after observing an increase in the house price, a more natural agent expects a longer-lasting
housing price appreciation, which gives stronger incentive to demand/supply debt. Second,
long-run expectations play a large role from a quantitative point of view: when the economy
is populated by more natural agents, the debt to income ratio during a boom phase is about
55 percent; when the economy is populated by less natural agents it falls to 35 percent. Recall
that the difference in these quantities is solely due to the contrasting long-run expectations
of housing prices, since by construction agents have the same short-run expectations in each
of the fifty specifications. Third, we show the importance of supply-side naturalness for
the increasing household debt leverage during the housing price boom and for the interest
rate reduction of home equity loans, as documented by Justiniano et al. (2014). In fact,
by conducting a simple experiment where only the bank or the household (or both) are
natural, we highlight that banks’ naturalness has a larger effect than households’ naturalness
in increasing the equilibrium level of debt in the economy, and that, consistent with economic
theory, it is the outward shift of the debt-supply schedule driven by banks’ naturalness that is
able to generate lower interest rates in home-equity-related debt. Hence, whereas Justiniano
et al. (2014) explain increased levels of household debt (at lower prices) with the relaxation
of lending constraints, our paper proposes an alternative story for the outward shift in credit
supply observed during the phase of rising housing price. As a last result, using data on Gross
Home Equity Extraction as computed in Greenspan and Kennedy (2005), we show that the
simulated process that better fits the observed debt dynamics during the 2000-2009 housing
price boom is characterized by a rather high degree of naturalness.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we document the tight rela-
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tionship between housing prices and households’ economic behavior in the United States, and
we provide evidence that financial experts’ forecasted future housing prices were not able to
incorporate their long-run downward adjustment after a positive momentum. In section 3
we discuss the properties of natural expectations and their implications for long-run housing
price forecasts. In section 4 we describe the theoretical model, and in section 5 we describe its
calibration. In section 6 we discuss the quantitative results of the model. Section 7 concludes
and summarizes the main findings.
2 Debt, Housing Prices, and Professional Forecasts
The goal of this paper is to analyze the interaction between housing price forecasts and pri-
vate agents’ economic behavior in the credit market. This link is not obvious if one considers
housing an illiquid asset. However, recent innovations in financial markets and, in particular,
the growing popularity of home equity loans have contributed to make housing a liquid asset,
thus strengthening the relationship between housing prices (and housing wealth) and agents’
consumption/saving decisions.12 To understand the rising popularity of such financial instru-
ments in the last decades, in Figure 1 we plot the flow of home equity extracted by households
(in billions of dollars, solid line), together with the Standard & Poor’s Case-Shiller Home Price
Index (dashed line). The positive trend starting from the beginning of the ’90s, as well as
the comovement between Home Equity Extraction (HEE) and housing prices, are evident: in
1992 the value of HEE was about $41 billion (in 2006 dollars); at the end of 1999, HEE value
more than doubled to about $95 billion; and from 2000 to 2006, when housing price growth
was at its peak, HEE almost tripled.
This evidence has been already examined in the literature. For example, Mian and Sufi
(2011) estimate the aggregate impact of the home equity-based borrowing channel, finding
that $1.25 trillion (i.e. about 2 percent of GDP per year) of the rise in household debt from
2002 to 2006 is attributable to existing homeowners borrowing against the increased value of
their homes. Disney and Gathergood (2011) present evidence for the relationship between
housing price growth and household indebtedness among homeowners in the United States
from 1999 to 2007, and find that rising housing prices explain roughly 20 percent of the growth
in indebtedness among U.S. households. Brown et al. (2013) find that all homeowner types
increased their housing and non-housing debt in response to the housing price boom.
One possible explanation for the large exposure of households to home equity loans is their
12Home equity loans allow households to borrow up to a maximum amount within a given term, pledging
their home equity as a collateral.
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inability to correctly forecast future housing prices, as largely suggested and documented in
the literature.13 Importantly, Case et al. (2012) present evidence, based on annual household
surveys between 2003 and 2012, showing that while households have been rather accurate in
predicting short-term housing price appreciation, their long-term forecasts have been largely
upward biased until 2005, when a strong revision of long-term forecasts occurred. Though
households’ expectations about future housing prices are obviously important, they cannot be
the sole ingredient for the high level of collateralized debt. In fact, if demand for debt increases
(thanks to households’ upwardly biased long-term housing price forecasts) but supply of debt
does not shift, basic economic theory suggests that the economy should experience an increased
level of debt at higher costs -namely, higher interest rates. Nevertheless, as Justiniano et al.
(2014) document, this is counterfactual since the recent home equity loan boom has been
associated with low interest rates. To reconcile this evidence, in this paper we highlight that
the supply side’s house price expectations were particularly important for the recent home
equity extraction boom. Specifically, we provide evidence that financial experts behave as
natural agents, in the sense that, when making forecasts, they did not take into account any
sort of long-run mean reversion in housing prices after a large short-run momentum.
2.1 Financial Experts Forecasts
In this section we provide evidence that models used by financial experts to forecast
future housing prices were not able to incorporate their long-run downward adjustment after
a positive momentum, which led to too optimistic future housing price expectations. For this
reason, it is not unreasonable to consider financial experts as natural agents, in the sense that,
as Fuster et al. (2012) define, they have ignored the hump-shaped dynamics of the housing
price process that indeed characterize the housing price data, as we document later in the
paper.
Specifically, we analyze a unique data set that contains out-of-sample forecasts of quarterly
housing prices up to a horizon of 30 years, produced by a professional forecasting company.14
13There is a large literature documenting that homeowners tend to overestimate both the current value of
their house and their future values. For example, Goodman and Ittner (1992) states that households’ housing
price estimates are between 4 percent and 16 percent larger that the actual realization. Shiller (2007) states
that a significant factor in the housing boom was the perception that housing is a profitable investment and
that housing price appreciation generated expectations of future price appreciation. Using panel data from
2002 to 2005 Agarwal (2007) finds that homeowners significantly overestimate the value of their home by on
average 3.1 percent. Ben¨ıtez-Silva et al. (2008) estimate a sale-price equation as a function of a self-reported
housing wealth, concluding that homeowners in average over estimate the value of their home by 5 percent to
10 percent. In addition, data show that the overestimation was more likely after 1980.
14This globally recognized professional forecasting company provided us with their nominal housing price
out-of-sample forecasts generated by their models. Unfortunately, the company was willing to privately disclose
to us point estimates only.
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The model used for generating the forecasts is described as a rich demand-supply model
that takes into account long-term influences on housing prices, such as income trends and
demographics, and cyclical factors such as unemployment and changes in mortgage rates.
These forecasts began in 1995 and were updated every quarter until the end of 2011. We take
these forecasts as a proxy for the forecasts made by financial experts. We believe that since
these forecasts were made by a professional forecasting company they are not subject to a
“bad incentive” bias. Specifically, Barberis (2013) suggests that financial institutions might
have had incentives to sell real estate financial instruments even when predicting a coming
house price collapse. The fact that our dataset is not provided by a financial institution rules
out the possible problem that these forecasts were simply strategic statements to sell specific
product to clients. Our underlying assumption is, then, than these forecasts collect what the
financial experts really knew about the future evolution of house prices.
Figure 2 shows the professional forecasts of a nominal housing price index for the period
1998-2020. In this figure we consider four forecasts made in the period 1998-2006, before the
bust of the housing bubble. The red dotted line represents the forecast made in 2000Q1, the
green circled line represents the forecast made in 2002Q1, the purple dashed line represent
the forecast made in 2004Q1, and the blue dash-dotted line is the forecast made in 2006Q1.
As the figure displays, the forecast made in 2000, 2002, and 2004 looking one to two quarters
ahead were relatively accurate since they are very close to the actual realization of the housing
prices (solid tick line). Nevertheless, the forecasts computed in those three years were not able
to capture the steep price appreciation that characterized the period 2000-2007. Furthermore,
and most importantly, all the forecasts were completely unable to predict the large housing
price bust experience in 2006. Notice that the forecasters expected overall constant and large
increases in long-run housing prices for the period 2000-2030.
We argue that these forecasts are consistent with the assumption that professional fore-
casters also failed to take into account any sort of long-run mean reversion in housing prices.
To support this point, in Table 1 we report the average annualized growth rate from the year
of the forecast (each row) to the horizon year (each column). Three main features are worth
noticing. First, notice that all the forecasted average annualized housing price growth rates
from the six dates in which forecasts were made (1995, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2006) to 2010
were much larger than their actually realized counterparts (in parenthesis). For example,
the predicted average appreciation of housing price for the 12-years period between 1998 and
2010 was 3.97 percent per year, whereas the realized average was only 2.2 percent per year.
Second, notice that the forecaster does not predict an adjustment in long-run housing prices,
following a period of appreciation. In fact, all the annualized housing price growth rates in
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Table 1 are large and range between than 3.1 percent and 4.1 percent. It is evident that
periods of stagnation in housing prices are not expected. Finally, notice that the predicted
average growth rate in the long run (2030) is very similar to the forecasted growth rate in
the short run: this difference ranges from -0.66 percent (for the forecast made in 2006) to
0.07 percent (for the forecast made in 2000). This is further evidence that the model used to
generate these forecasts does not take into account a high degree of mean reversion.
We can observe the stable dynamics of the forecasts by computing the x-quarters ahead
forecasts for each year in which the forecast was made, as reported in Table 2. We consider
both short-run forecasts (x=1,4,8) and long-run forecasts (x=20,40,80). We normalize the
housing price in the quarter in which the forecast was made to be equal to 100, and we
analyze the dynamics of the forecast in relation to that value. Three main properties of
the forecasts emerge from Table 2. First, forecasts made throughout the period 1995-2006
expected housing prices to largely appreciate. Second, the dynamics of the forecasts as a
function of the horizon are roughly independent from the period in which the forecast was
made. In fact, all of the forecasts imply increasingly large appreciations of housing prices over
time: the one-year-ahead forecasts imply increases of 2 percent to almost 4 percent; the five-
year-ahead forecasts imply increases of 15 percent to 22 percent; the 10-year-ahead forecasts
imply increases of 34 percent to 47 percent; and the 20-year ahead forecasts imply increases of
79 percent to 113 percent. Although the magnitude of the forecasted appreciation varies, we
argue that throughout the period 1995-2006 there is no evidence of an adjustment in terms
of housing price forecasts.
All the evidence provided in this section should convey that it is not unreasonable to
assume that financial experts might also have been exposed to some source of bias that led
them to ignore the mean-reversion component of housing prices growth. These findings are
in line with other studies on the behavior of housing market experts during the boom phase.
Gerardi et al. (2008) show that analysts and experts attached a very low probability to a
significant reduction in house prices, while Cheng et al. (2014) find that securitization agents
were on average not aware of the overvaluation of the housing market.15 The optimism
about house prices is reflected in the risk (and the subsequent losses) borne by financial
intermediaries, which kept the vast majority of second liens on their balance sheets, while
securitizing first-lien mortgages).16
15Interestingly, their study finds that “certain groups of agents - those living in bubblier areas, working on
the sell side, or at firms with greater exposure to subprime mortgages - may have been particularly subject to
potential sources of belief distortions, such as job environments that foster group think, cognitive dissonance,
or other sources of over-optimism.”
16See for instance Figure 4 from ”Residential Credit Losses - Going into Extra Innings?” Lehman Brothers
U.S. Securitized Products, April 11, 2008 (reprinted in Acharya et al. (2009)), where it is shown that a relevant
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The main conclusion we draw from this section is that professional forecasters were most
likely making use of models that were not able to capture any sort of mean reversion in
long-run housing price dynamics. In this regard, we can state that financial experts displayed
natural expectations, as we will formally define in the next section. Even though financial
experts- unlike households - commonly make use of large and convoluted models to generate
forecasts, it seems evident that the internal propagation mechanisms of these models are
inadequate to the task of capturing the long-run mean reversion pattern that characterizes
housing prices. In this sense, our evidence supports the hypothesis proposed by Barberis
(2013) that financial experts used “bad models” for predicting future housing prices and that
these models let them to be too optimistic about future values of collateral. This has likely
affected the supply of credit, as we show in the next sections.
3 Natural House Price Expectations
The main goal of this paper is to link the inability of agents to take into account the
long-run hump-shaped dynamics of housing prices when making forecasts, and the amount of
housing-related debt demanded or supplied. In this section we show three results that establish
this linkage. First, it is, indeed, likely that housing prices are characterized by hump-shaped
dynamics, which imply a large momentum in the short run and partial mean reversion in the
long run. Second, we document that models that incorporate hump-shaped dynamics are not
preferred, in terms of in-sample fit, to more parsimonious models that ignore long-run mean
reversion. As a result, the use of simple models leading to natural beliefs is perfectly justifiable
in terms of in-sample performance. Third, we demonstrate that, nevertheless, models with
diverse degrees of ability in capturing the hump-shaped dynamics of housing prices differ in
their long-run forecasts, although they have similar short-run predictions. Hence, if agents
use simple models (for a wide range of good reasons17), they fail to forecast the partial mean
reversion in housing prices over the long run (this is in line with the pattern shown by the
financial experts’ forecasts documented in the previous section). Following Fuster et al. (2010),
we call the resulting beliefs of these agents natural expectations.
fraction of HELOCs and second-liens were kept in the balance sheets of US banks.
17As Fuster et al. (2010) put: “simple models are easier to understand, easier to explain, and easier to
employ; simplicity also reduces the risks of overfitting. Whatever the mix of reasons -pragmatic, behavioral,
and statistical- economic agents usually do use simple models to understand economic dynamics”.
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3.1 Modeling Natural Expectations for Housing Prices
In this section we examine data for the aggregate real U.S. housing price index, and we
analyze how different modeling approaches vary in their ability to capture hump-shaped long-
run dynamics. The series of interest is the quarterly Standard & Poor’s Case-Shiller Home
Price Index for U.S. real housing prices in the sample 1951:1-2010:4. The logarithm of the
raw series is plotted in the upper panel of Figure 3. The series displays at least four episodes
of boom and bust: the first one in the early ’70s, the second one later in the decade, the third
one in the ’80s, and, finally, the most recent and significant from 1997 to 2005.
The series is statistically characterized by the presence of a unit root.18 We therefore
consider as a variable of interest its year-over-year growth rate, displayed in the bottom panel
of Figure 3. Notice also that the growth rate of housing prices is characterized by relatively
long periods of increase followed by abrupt declines, which indicate the presence of a rich
autocorrelation structure.
We then assume that the process for housing price growth rate, gt is autoregressive,
19 i.e.:
(1− Φp (L)) gt = µ+ εt, (1)
where Φp (L) is a lag polynomial of order p, µ is a constant, and εt are iid innovations.
We assume that an agent could estimate the model in equation (1) using four different
criteria that gather a spectrum of different approaches to estimation and forecasting. Initially,
we propose two simple models that capture natural expectations on housing prices. Recall
that, as in Fuster et al. (2010), we define natural expectations as the beliefs of agents that fail
to incorporate hump-shaped long-run dynamics of the fundamentals. We explore two possible
dimensions that lead to natural expectations : (1) a limited ability of agents to incorporate a
large set of explanatory variables when estimating a model; and (2) a limited ability of agents
to consider a large set of data when estimating the model. Regarding the first model, we
assume that an agent naively considers a first order polynomial, that is p = 1 and Φp (L) =
1 − φ1L when estimating equation (1). This assumption captures behavioral biases, such
as a natural attitude to use over-simplified models, as reported in Beshears et al. (2013)
18To formally test the null hypothesis of presence of a unit root in the house price level, we run the Phillips
and Perron (1988) unit root test. We allowed the regression to incorporate from one to 15 lags. For any of
these specifications the test could not reject the null hypothesis of a presence of a unit root. To check whether
the presence of a unit root is driven by the 1997-2007 price boom, we run the test for the shorter sample
1953:1-1996:4. Also in this case, the Phillips-Perron test could not reject the null hypothesis at a 5 percent
significance level for any model specifications. In addition, there is no statistical evidence that the house price
of growth rate contains unit roots.
19Our modeling choice is justified by, Crawford and Fratantoni (2003) who show that linear (ARMA) models
are preferred to non-linear housing price models for out-of-sample forecasts.
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and analyzed in Hommes and Zhu (2014). We refer to this model as intuitive expectations,
consistently with Fuster et al. (2010). Regarding the second model, we assume that an agent
has finite memory and accordingly forecasts the model in equation (1) by considering only
the most recent observations. In particular, we assume that agents consider only the last
T lim = 100 observations when estimating the model.20 The underlying assumption is that
agents using this model do not take into account the earlier historical housing price dynamics,
either because they do not have access to those data, or because they ignore them, or simply
because they assign much lower weight to older observations. We refer to this model as finite
memory.21 Notice that the finite memory model captures a source of bias that does not
emerge because of a possible model mis-specification (as for the intuitive expectations model),
but the bias depends upon the limited amount of information that is relevant for the agent
when estimating the model.22
We then compare the implications of these natural expectations models with the ones
produced by more rigorous and sophisticated statistical approaches. In fact, an agent could,
to the contrary, make use of more sophisticated econometric techniques to estimate the more
appropriate lag polynomial in equation (1). When choosing how many parameters to include,
a modeler faces a trade-off between improving the fit of the model in-sample and the risk
of overfitting the available data, which may result in poor out-of-sample forecasts. Two
of the most popular criteria are the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the Bayesian
Information Criterion (BIC). It is not clear which criterion should be preferred by practitioners
in small samples.23 Generally, the BIC imposes a larger penalty for increasing the number of
parameters, and thus will tend to select models with fewer parameters than the AIC. As a
result, as shown by Fuster et al. (2012), when the true model is characterized by hump-shape
patterns, the BIC selects models that are not able to capture the true dynamics. Hence, these
two approaches might lead to different specifications of the model in equation (1). Therefore,
we consider as third and fourth models the specification of equation (1) obtained when an
econometrician uses respectively the AIC criterion and the BIC criterion.
20We obtain similar results when varying T lim in the range 80-120.
21There are other interpretation for this approach. For example, agents might have adopted a “new-era
thinking”, which referes to agents deliberately excluding older observation because they believe they are not
relevant anymore. Alternatively this approach can also capture the assumption of extrapolative expectations
in the housing market employed by Goetzmann et al. (2012), Abraham and Hendershott (1994), Muellbauer
and Murphy (1997)), Piazzesi and Schneider (2009), and it relates to the findings of Agarwal (2007) and
Duca and Kumar (2014), which state that younger individuals have statistically significant more propensity
to overestimate house prices and to withdraw housing equity, respectively.
22We assume that the agent with finite memory estimates the model by maximizing information criteria.
Since the BIC and AIC select the same length for the lag-polynomial, the two approaches deliver the same
results.
23See McQuarrie and Tsai (1998) and Neath and Cavanaugh (1997) for opposite arguments.
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In Table 3 (left panel for the whole sample 1953:1-2010:4) we report point estimates
(standard errors in brackets) for four models: p = 1, estimated by an intuitive model; p = 6,
estimated by a finite memory model; p = 5, estimated by the BIC model; p = 16, estimated
with the AIC model. Notice that there is a remarkable difference in the number of lags selected
by the last two models: since the BIC criterion largely penalizes overfitting, it select much
fewer lags than the AIC criterion. Furthermore, the large number of significant parameters for
lags greater than one, in particular for the AIC model, confirms that the process of housing
price growth has a relatively rich autoregressive structure. Consequently, an agent who makes
use of a simpler autoregressive model is likely to ignore important dynamics of house price
growth. The different long-run implications of the models are summarized by their resulting
long-run persistence, as discussed in detail below. Notice that these findings are robust to
considering only a more limited sample (1953:1-1996:4) that does not include a recent housing
price boom, as reported on the right panel of Table 3.
3.2 In-sample Fit and Long-Run Predictions
In the previous section we have reported the estimates of four different specifications of
a linear model for housing price growth. In this section we provide evidence that, although
drastically contrasting in their underlying assumptions, these specifications have similar in-
sample properties, and they are hardly distinguishable from a statistical point of view. Table
4 reports statistics about the goodness of fit of the four models. The Root Mean Squared
Error (RMSE), the unadjusted coefficient of determination (R2), and the adjusted coefficient
of determination (R¯2) are very similar across the models.24 Since the intuitive model, the
BIC model, and the AIC model are all nested models, we can formally test whether the data
can formally reject the null hypothesis that the three models are observationally similar by
comparing the log-likelihood evaluated at the unrestricted model parameter estimates and
the restricted model parameter estimates. As Table 4 displays, the resulting Likelihood Ratio
(LR) test statistics when assuming that the restricted model corresponds to p = 1 and the
unrestricted model corresponds to p = 5 and p = 16, respectively, confirm that the models
cannot be distinguished on the basis of goodness-of-fit alone. Since the finite memory model
considers a different sample, it cannot be nested in the other three models. Hence, the LR
test cannot be applied. Nevertheless, notice that its likelihood is very similar to the one of
the other three models. Notice, too, that the one-quarter-ahead forecasts produced by these
24Although we do not report them here, the historical in-sample fitted values of the four model are basically
indistinguishable. Therefore, they the different empirical models have a very similar ability to capture the
in-sample boom-and-bust episodes.
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models are also similar.
Although the models imply a similar fit to the data and similar short-run predictions, their
long-run out-of sample forecast implications are different. We can observe these features of
the models by plotting the impulse response functions for a 1 percent positive shock in the
housing price growth rate, as displayed in the top panel of Figure 4. The intuitive model (solid
blue line) estimates a very persistent process, as indicated by the value of the parameter of the
AR(1) process, equal to 0.96 as reported in Table 3. Consequently, it predicts a long-lasting
positive effect of a shock on housing price growth. In contrast, the BIC model (dashed red line)
and the AIC model (dotted green line) predict larger short-run responses of housing prices,
but they estimate faster reversions after 10-15 quarters. Notice, also, that the practitioner
who uses the AIC criterion estimates a negative medium-run response of price-growth after
the large boom, but even this model does not particularly succeed of incorporating a large
mean reversion component of house price. This fact shows that it is hard to obtain mean-
reversion dynamics even with more sophisticated models when estimated in small samples.
Finally, the finite memory model (dotted purple line) has a very large short-run response and
implies a persistence of the positive shock for about 30 quarters, without any sort of mean
reversion.
We can obtain insights about the different long-run predictions of the models by plotting
the impulse responses of the level of the housing prices, as displayed in the lower panel of
Figure 4. These responses are given by the cumulative sum of the impulse responses of the
growth rate. An agent using the finite memory model (dotted purple line) predicts that, after
a positive shock, the housing prices will largely increase for about 25-30 quarters and then
stabilize at a high level. An agent using the intuitive model (solid blue line) expects a longer
persistence of the housing price appreciation, which leads to a similar long-run forecasts as
with the finite memory model. The two more sophisticated models (BIC model, dashed red
line, and AIC model, dotted green line) predict a much lower degree of persistence, which leads
to lower expected long-run prices. In fact, they prove better in capturing the mean-reversion
feature of housing prices than both the intuitive model and the finite memory model. Notice
also, that an econometrician using the AIC criterion expects a depreciation following the
initial boom. Furthermore, since the four models are hardly distinguishable in the sample, as
pointed out above, it is legitimate to conjecture that these impulse responses are associated
with a large degree of uncertainty. Not surprisingly, this is indeed the case, as described in
Appendix A.
The long-run dynamics of housing prices are particularly important for the purpose of this
paper. In fact, we conjecture that households’ consumption-saving decisions are affected by
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the perceived long-run housing wealth. This presumption is motivated by the long durability
of housing as an asset, and by the nature of home equity loans, which have repayment periods
of up to 25 years. It is therefore reasonable to assume that long-run forecasts of housing prices
matter for households’ present decisions. A measure of the long-run price estimated after a
shock is the long-run persistence of the price level, defined as the long run steady state level
after a 1 percent shock. Given that the price level is assumed to follow an ARIMA(p,1,0)
model, the long-run persistence (LRP) can be computed as:
LRP =
1
1−
p∑
j=1
φj
(2)
where φj , j = 1, ..., p are the coefficients of the lag polynomial of order p, Φp (L). Table 4
reports the LRP of the processes estimated by the four models as well as their confidence
band.
As Table 4 reports, the LRP estimated with an intuitive model is larger than the one
estimated by agents using a more rigorous statistical approach. In particular, the AR(1) model
delivers a long-run persistence that is 30 percent higher than the AR(5) model selected by
the BIC, and 80 percent higher than the AR(16) model selected by the AIC.25 Also, the LRP
estimated by the finite memory model is similar to the one estimated by the intuitive model.
This an important result since it shows that agents who use oversimplified models (because
of behavioral biases or sample selection) tend to have more optimistic expectations about
long-run housing price resulting after a positive shock than agents using more sophisticated
models. In Table 9 in Appendix B we report similar results obtained when considering annual
data, confirming that our findings are not an artifact of data frequencies.
This section shows that there is a spectrum of approaches to a linear model for house price
growth that are fairly equivalent in terms of their capability of fitting the data. These ap-
proaches range from capturing behavioral biases to including sophisticated and more rigorous
statistical perspective. Although these models are hardly distinguishable by their in-sample
properties, their long-run forecasts implications are different. In fact, the more sophisticated
approaches are more capable (although at different degrees) of incorporating mean reversion
dynamics in their forecasts, whereas natural models (as intuitive model and the finite memory
25As a robustness check, we have alternatively assumed that the housing price growth rate gt is an
autoregressive-moving average process, as in (1− Φp (L)) gt = µ + (1 + Θq (L)) εt, where Θq (L) is a lag
polynomial of order q. The BIC estimates an ARMA(1,4), whereas the AIC estimates an ARMA(18,5). Since
the Long Run Persistence (18.6 for ARMA(1,4) and 12.9 for the ARMA (18,5)) and the Impulse Response
functions estimated with the ARMA processes are very similar to the one estimated with the AR processes
we decided to present only the latter.
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model) project larger forecasted long-run prices.
4 A Model for Home Equity Loans and Natural Expec-
tations
In this section we propose a model in which a representative household and a represen-
tative bank interact in a credit market and in which the household may obtain credit by
pledging its house as collateral. This feature captures the role of home equity loans in the
economy. Importantly, we allow agents to have a range of expectations upon the evolution
of the exogenous housing price. This range of expectations varies with the degree to which
agents are able to incorporate long run mean reversion of house prices. Hence, the expecta-
tions vary from more natural (lower ability to incorporate long-run mean reversion) to less
natural (greater ability to incorporate long-run mean reversion). Our theoretical model can
be used as a laboratory to investigate the extent to which naturalness of households and banks
has affected the level of debt in the economy during the housing price boom.
4.1 Household
The economy lasts T < ∞ periods. The economy is populated by two representative
agents: a household and a bank. There are a non-storable consumption good and two assets:
housing and debt claims. The household starts at t = 0 with an endowment of housing stock
h worth p0h, where pt denotes the real housing price at time t, and the household is allowed
to sell the house only in the final period, at a price pT , unless it decides to default in any time
t = 1, ..., T−1. In case of default, the household loses the ownership of the house and becomes
a renter. When the household decides to default, it is excluded from the debt market as it
does not have any collateral to pledge. Because the household starts with an owned housing
stock and with no previous debt, and because it does not engage in buying or selling of its
housing stock, we can interpret the debt claims in the economy as home equity extraction.26
We assume that the household is endowed in each period with a constant income yt = y > 0.
The housing price is an exogenous variable for the agents in our economy.27
26Though this interpretation is made simply to relate our model to the evidence reported in section 2, our
results clearly extend more generally to any type of collateralized borrowing.
27This simplifying assumption is justified by this paper’s goal of understanding how different expectations
about the evolution of housing prices affect agents’ economic behavior. Moreover, this same assumption is
used in several studies on the effects of housing on macroeconomic or financial decisions, as in Campbell and
Cocco (2011) or Cocco (2005).
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The household is allowed to borrow resources from the bank with the house serving as
collateral. Subject to the repayment of debt accumulated in the past, in period t the household
is allowed to borrow new debt dt which it will eventually repay in the next period at an interest
rate of rt. The household has the option of defaulting from t = 1 onwards. Hence, the budget
constraint of a household that repays its debt at time t is:
ct + (1 + rt−1)dt−1 = y + dt;
whereas, the budget constraint of a household that decides to default at time t is:
ct + γpth = y,
where γpth represents the renting cost, which is assumed, for simplicity, to be a fraction γ of
the house’s value.
The household, then, maximizes its intertemporal utility:
E0
∑T
t=0 β
tu(ct, h),
subject to the period-by-period budget constraint, which is conditional on the default decision.
Later, we will discuss in depth how agents’ expectations are formed. In each period the
household’s choice defines a debt demand schedule dt (rt) and a related default decision.
We can rewrite the problem recursively. Since the economy lasts for a finite number of
periods, the model can be solved by backward induction. Let us then start from period t = T :
if the household has never defaulted in the past, in the last period it is entitled to sell its
housing stock; hence the only decision variable is whether to default or not to default. Since
the household sells the housing stock in the last period, there is no possibility of getting new
debt, and, thus, consumption is simply determined by the exogenous income and housing
value.
In case of a good credit history (i.e. no past default), the problem in period T can be then
written as:
V ∗T (rT−1, dT−1, pT ) = max {u (y − γpTh) ;u (y − (1 + rT−1)dT−1 + pTh)} . (3)
Provided that the household did not default in the past, it has the option of defaulting in
periods t = 1, ..., T − 1. Hence, for t = 1, ..., T − 1 the household has to compare two value
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functions: if it decides to default (or did so in the past), the value function writes:
V Dt (pt) = u (y − γpth) + βEtV Dt+1 (pt+1) , (4)
with dτ = 0 for τ ≥ t. In the event that the household did not default in the past and is not
defaulting in the current period t, the value function writes instead:
V Ct (rt−1, dt−1, pt) = max
dt
[
u (y − (1 + rt−1)dt−1 + dt) + βEt
{
V ∗t+1 (rt, dt, pt+1)
}]
. (5)
Hence, in each period t = 1, ..., T − 1, the household compares the two value functions to
pin down its default choice:
V ∗t (rt−1, dt−1, pt) = max
{
V Dt (pt) ;V
C
t (rt−1, dt−1, pt)
}
. (6)
Finally, in period t = 0 there is no default choice, since the household is assumed to start
with no debt; hence in t = 0 its value function reads:
V ∗0 (p0) = max
d0
[u (y + d0) + βEt {V ∗1 (r0, d0, p1)}] , (7)
with the initial stock of debt d−1 = 0 given.
4.2 Bank
The bank seeks to maximize its intertemporal stream of profits, taking into account the
probability of the household’s default. In other words, in each period the bank obtains loans
from outside the model at a risk-free rate, it. The bank then supplies credit to the household,
at a market interest rate rt. In case of default, the bank obtains revenue from liquidating the
household’s housing stock. The bank’s problem can also be expressed in recursive form. Let’s
start from the last period, t = T . The profits for the bank write:
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piT (rT−1, dT−1, pT ) =

(1 + rT−1)dT−1 − (1 + iT−1)dT−1 if the household does not default
(and did not default in the past)
κpTh− (1 + iT−1)dT−1 if the household defaults
(but did not in the past)
0 if the household defaulted
in the past.
(8)
Here κ represents the fraction of the collateral that the bank can recover after the household’s
default.
For a given interest rate rt, in periods t = 1, ..., T − 1 the bank sets dt in such a way as to
maximize its profits:
max
dt
pit (rt−1, dt−1, pt) =

(rt−1 − it−1)dt−1 + δEtpit+1 (rt, dt, pt+1) if the household does not default
(and did not default in the past)
κpth− (1 + it−1)dt−1 if the household defaults
(but did not in the past)
0 if the household defaulted
in the past.
(9)
By assumption, the bank cannot default on its obligations.28 Finally, the profit function in
t = 0 writes:
pi0 (p0) = δE0pi1 (r0, d0, p1) . (10)
4.3 Recursive equilibrium
A recursive equilibrium in our economy can be defined, for t = 0, ..., T − 1, as an interest
rate function rt(pt, dt−1, rt−1), a debt function dt(pt, dt−1, rt−1) and value functions V Dt (pt),
V Ct (rt−1, dt−1, pt) and pit (rt−1, dt−1, pt) such that in each period t = 0, ..., T − 1 and for each
realization of the housing price pt and realizations of rt−1 and dt−1:
• given rt, dt(pt, dt−1, rt−1) and value functions V Dt (pt), V Ct (rt−1, dt−1, pt) solve the house-
28To ensure limited liability, one can assume that the bank has access to a fixed amount of extra resources
(equity) that allows it to repay the debt when revenues fall short of liabilities.
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hold recursive maximization problem.
• given rt and providing that no default has occurred up to period t, dt(pt, dt−1, rt−1) and
the profit function pit (rt−1, dt−1, pt) solve the bank maximization profit.
• markets for the consumption good and debt clear.
In period t = T the household maximizes its utility under the budget constraint, choos-
ing whether or not to default.
4.4 Expectation Formation
In our model we treat housing prices as exogenous and assume that the growth rate of the
housing price follows a stochastic process. Accordingly, given a price of housing in the initial
period, p0, the evolution of the house price is given by:
pt+1 = pt
(
1 + rht+1
)
, (11)
with:
(1−Θp(L)) rht+1 = σεt+1, (12)
Here, rht+1 denotes the growth rate of housing price, Θ
p(L) is a lag polynomial of order p > 1,
and εt+1 is a mean-zero stochastic variable. This specification links the expectation of future
house price growth rate to the autoregressive structure of the process, i.e.:
Etrht+1 = Θp(L)rht . (13)
As it will be clear next section, we examine the predictions of the model when varying the
form of perceived expectation on future house prices by varying the properties of the lag
polynomial Θp(L).
5 Calibration
By using the model described in the previous section, we now assess the quantitative
effects of natural expectations in the consumption/saving decision. We are mainly interested
in examining the extent to which the equilibrium level of housing-related debt and its price
vary with the ability of agents to take into account possible long-run mean-reverting dynamics
of house prices.
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We consider an economy that last T=10 periods (years). The length of the simulation is
a computationally restricted parameter, since in a non-stationary model the number of state-
variables quickly explodes when increasing the number of periods in the model.29 However, a
10-period time span is appealing for two reasons. First, it is long enough to fully capture a
boom-bust episode such as the one observed in the U.S. housing market in the 2000s. Second,
a large portion of HELOCs started during the boom years had a duration of around 10 years.30
We conduct the following experiment. We feed the model with a given path of housing
prices for 10 periods, which aims to replicate the boom-bust episode as experienced in the
U.S. in the period 2001-2010. Then, we vary the agents’ beliefs about the process generating
the observed evolution of housing prices. Therefore, after observing the same initial housing
price appreciation, different beliefs about the housing price data generating process affect the
agents’ optimal economic behavior.
The imposed evolution of housing price (solid line) is displayed in Figure 5. In the boom
phase, from t = 1 up to t = 6, the housing price grows by 83 percent, whereas in the bust
phase, from t = 7 up to t = 10, the housing price drops by 39 percent. This evolution of the
housing price reflects the dynamics of the Shiller real house price index in the U.S. (dashed line
in Figure 5) in the decade 2000-2009. Ultimately, we assume that agents in our model always
observe the same evolution of housing prices and they rely on an autoregressive specification
for the housing price growth rate in equation (12) of the form:
rht+1 = Θ
p(L)rht + σεt+1,
where Θp(L) is a lag polynomial of order p > 1. To investigate the impact of different forms
of expectations, we consider a large set of specifications of Θp(L) that generate forecasts that
are similar in the short run but different in the long run. It is important to no te that we
are completely silent about the true process that generated the observed housing price series.
This is outside the scope of our analysis. In fact, in the empirical sections above, we showed
that a large set of theoretical processes are consistent with the observed historical housing
price time series. In our theoretical experiment, we investigate how macroeconomic variables
are affected by agents taking actions based on a diverse spectrum of plausible data generating
29Campbell and Cocco (2011), one of the closest models to ours, is simulated over a 20-years span. However,
in order to keep the state space confined, Campbell and Cocco (2011) consider a iid housing price growth
process, approximated by a bimodal Markov process. By reducing the length of the simulation to 10 periods,
we are able to consider richer housing price dynamics, allowing for an autoregressive process approximated
by a tri-modal Markov process, whereas Campbell and Cocco (2011) consider only a bi-modal process.
30From the Semiannual Risk Perspective From the National Risk Committee, U.S. Department of Treasury,
2012, it can be inferred that this portion was equal to at least 58 percent of loans outstanding in 2012.
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processes.
5.1 Calibrating Expectations
We consider 50 specifications for the model in equation (12) to generate agents’ expec-
tations of future housing prices. This large number of specifications allows us to investigate
how macroeconomic variables respond to rather small differences in expectation formation.
For computational feasibility, we limit our investigation to processes of order two, i.e.:
rht+1 = µ(1− θ1 − θ2) + θ1rht + θ2rht−1 + σεt+1. (14)
Even if parsimonious, this specification is flexible enough to capture features of the U.S.
housing price index observed during the last boom-bust episode, and, above all, it allows us
to incorporate different degrees of ability to embody hump-shaped dynamics. As a result, each
specification is a function of four parameters: µ, θ1, θ2, σ. We assume that the average growth
rate of housing prices, µ, is known, and it is constant across each specification. In particular,
we fix µ = 0, which is consistent with the historical average growth rate of the real Shiller
index between 1953 and 2000, which is equal to 0.00016. We make use of three criteria to pin
down the remaining three parameters (θ1, θ2, σ) for each specification. First, each specification
should produce the same short-run (one-year-ahead) forecasts. This assumption is motivated
by the evidence in Case et al. (2012), which find that, in the short run, homebuyers were
generally well informed, that their short-run expectations were not largely different from
the actual realized home prices, and that most of the root causes of the housing bubble
can be reconnected to their long-term home price expectations. Also this assumption is
motived by the fact that natural expectations are able to capture short-run momentum, but
fail to predict more subtle long-run mean reversion. Second, each specification should imply
the same unconditional variance. As a consequence, the different behavior implied by each
specification does not depend upon the magnitude of the housing-price variance, but only
upon its propagation. Third, and most important, each specification should be characterized
by different long-run forecasts. As a result, each specification differs only for the degree by
which it is able to capture some sort of long-run mean reversion, when keeping fixed the
short-run predictions and the overall variance of the process. Specifically, we set the first
order autoregressive parameter, θ1, to be equal to 0.6, which is the persistence of an AR(1)
process estimated using the Case-Shiller index annual growth rate. Since the one-step-ahead
forecasts of an AR(2) process is only a function of θ1, each specification implies the same
one-year forecast. The long-run predictions of a model can be summarized by its long-run
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persistence (LRP). When considering annual data (see Table 9 in Appendix B), the LRP
estimate range from the 1.5 (as estimated by the AIC model) to 2.8 (as estimated with the
intuitive model). As Table 9 displays, there is a substantial degree of uncertainty around
the estimated LRP. To capture this uncertainty, we consider specifications for process in (14)
such that their LRP ranges between 1.4 and 4.5. Since the long-run persistence is given by
LRP = 1
1−θ1−θ2 , the values of LRP in this range pin down the different values of θ2. Finally,
the parameter σ is set to such that all specifications imply a constant standard deviation equal
to the estimated value from Case-Shiller index annual growth rate, which is equal to 0.049.
This approach allows us to isolate the effects of a change in the perceived persistence of the
house price growth rate process from changes in its perceived unconditional variance.31 Table
5 reports the resulting calibration for six specifications of the model in equation (12) among
the 50 that we consider in our simulation, together with the implied long-run persistence.
Notice that the degree of naturalness of an agent is driven by the second order autoregressive
parameter, θ2: when this parameter is negative, agents are not natural since they expect
a long-run mean reversion of housing prices after a positive short-run momentum; when θ2
is positive, agents are natural since they expect the short-run momentum to persist in the
long-run.
Figure 6 displays the impulse response functions and their cumulative values for three of
the above-described processes. More precisely, we plot the IRFs and CIRFs of the AR(1)
process (Specification 5, cross-line), as a reference, along with the two “extreme”’ processes:
process 1 (solid line) representing the process with the lowest degree of naturalness and
which accordingly displays the strongest long-run mean reversion; process 50 (triangle-line)
representing the process with highest degree of naturalness. Notice that the forecasted long-
run price by process 50 is almost double the one implied by an AR(1) process.
5.2 Calibration of Structural Parameters
The calibrated structural parameters of the model and their values are reported in Table
6. We set the discount rate for both the household and the bank at 0.98, which is consistent
with an annual risk-free rate of 2 percent. The housing stock, h, can be interpreted as the
housing value in the initial period, since we set the initial housing price p equal to one. Hence,
31We have also run our model under the alternative assumption that the standard deviation of the shocks,
σ, is constant across the 50 specification, thus implying that the unconditional variance of the house growth
rate process increases with its perceived persistence. Since the results are very similar to the one described
in this paper (and therefore not reported here for sake of brevity), we infer that the main driving force of
our results is the different long-run responses of the house price to shock across specifications, more than its
unconditional volatility.
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h relates to the housing value to income in 2000. This value is equal to 2.1 in the Survey of
Consumer Finance data, whereas it is equal to 1.3 when considering national aggregate data.
Hence, we set h to be equal to the intermediate value of 1.5. We assume a constant relative
risk aversion (CRRA) utility function, i.e. u(c) = c
1−η−1
1−η , with coefficient of risk aversion η
equal to 2, a value broadly in line with the literature. Annual income, y, is standardized at
the level of 1. We assume that the rental rate, γ, is 5 percent of the current value of the
housing stock, thus implying a price-to-rent ratio equal to 0.05, which is consistent with the
setting in Garner and Verbrugge (2009) and in Hu (2005). Finally, we assume that when the
household defaults, the bank is able to recover only 20 percent of the value of the house. Such
a value is in line with our interpretation of the asset in the economy as an HELOC.32
6 Quantitative Effects of Natural Expectations
Given the calibration of the structural parameters, the 50 specifications of the housing price
growth process used by agents to forecast future housing prices, and the realized evolution
of housing price for the 10 periods, as shown in Figure 5, we can compute the equilibrium
dynamics of the variables of the model. Specifically, we are interested in the debt-to-income
ratio, d
y
, the consumption-to-income ratio, c
y
, the loan-to-value ratio, d
ph
, and the interest rate
associated with home equity loans, rt. We now investigate how these variables vary with
agents’ naturalness in the housing price boom and bust, separately.
6.1 Equilibrium in a boom
Figure 7 reports the average values of debt (upper left panel), LTV ratio (upper right
panel), consumption (lower left panel) and interest rate (lower right panel) for each of the 50
specifications of expected housing price growth (x-axis) across the boom phase (from period
1 to period 6 in our model, which corresponds to the period 2000-2005 in the data, blue
solid line) and across the bust (from period 7 to period 9 in our model, which corresponds
to the period 2007-2009 in the data, green dashed line). As a reference point, we denote
with a red circle the values associated with assuming the agents form expectations using
an AR(1) process, which relates to the intuitive statistical model as presented in Section
3. First, we consider the average values of our variables of interest during the boom phase.
Four results are worth highlighting. First, the model predicts a positive relationship between
the average equilibrium level of debt in the economy in the boom phase and the degree of
32Since HELOCs are junior-liens, and the maximum loan-to-value ratio for a first-lien is 80 percent, we are
then implicitly assuming that the bank is able to fully recover the value of the equity in the house sale.
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naturalness of agents. Recall that the 50 specifications for the expectations range from higher
ability of the model to incorporate long-run mean reversion (specification 1, low naturalness)
to lower ability of the model to incorporate long-run mean reversion (specification 50, high
naturalness). Intuitively, after observing an increase in the housing prices, a more natural
agent expects a longer-lasting appreciation of housing prices, which gives higher incentive
to demand/supply debt. In contrast, a less natural agent expects a short-run momentum
in housing prices followed by a mean reversion adjustment after some periods, as it can be
visualized by the impulse response function for specification 1 in Figure 6. As a result, the
household is less willing to demand debt and the bank is less willing to supply it. A second
important result relates to the magnitude of the role of long-run expectations. Notice when
agents in the economy are characterized by the lowest degree of naturalness, the equilibrium
level of debt is roughly 35 percent of income. In contrast, when the agents ignore hump-
shaped dynamics of housing prices, the equilibrium level of debt in the economy escalates
to 55 percent of income. We obtain a similar pattern when considering the loan-to-value
ratio, which increases from 18 percent for the least natural agents to 28 percent for the most
natural agents. The pronounced differences in these quantities is solely due to the contrasting
long-run expectations of housing prices, since by construction agents have the same short-run
expectations in each of the 50 specifications. These results strongly support the argument in
Case et al. (2012): the role of homebuyers’ long-run housing price expectations is a crucial
determinant of agents’ behavior in terms of the consumption/saving choice. As a third result,
notice that the accumulation of debt fuels consumption in the short-run, since there is positive
correlation among average consumption in a boom phase and the degree of naturalness of
agents in the economy. Intuitively, when expecting higher future appreciation of house’s
price, the resulting wealth effect provides incentives to consume in the current period. As a
forth result, notice that debt is associated with a lower interest rate in economies where agents
are more natural. Intuitively, since banks in the model share the same form of expectations
of households, when banks expect both short-run and long-run momentum in housing prices,
they are willing to lend at a lower equilibrium price.
The above findings can be summarized as follows: when housing prices start to increase,
a natural agent (a household or a bank) overestimates the persistence of positive shocks
and ignores the possible long-run mean reversion that follows a short-run momentum. As a
consequence, the household or bank also overestimates the overall long-run appreciation of
the housing stock. Given the availability of financial instruments to smooth future housing
wealth, a natural household has, then, more incentive to extract a large portion of home equity
to increase its consumption immediately. A natural bank will then be willing to provide loans
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to the household at lower price. As a result, natural expectations leads to large leverage
during a housing price boom.
6.2 Equilibrium in a bust
The second set of results concerns the adjustment that the economy makes during the
house price bust (periods from 6 to 9). These results reflect the predictions of our model
for the behavior of agents in the period 2007-2009 and they show that the relationships
between debt, consumption and degree of naturalness described above for the boom period
are reversed. More natural households deleverage their debt position and they drastically
reduce their consumption. Specifically, in the economies with most natural agents (processes
47-50), the amount of debt the household is able to extract is null.33 Although quite drastic,
this result is in line with evidence regarding the practice of HELOC freezes observed since
2008, when financial institutions realized the depth of the bust (WSJ, 2008). Notice that the
adjustment if households were less natural households would be less sharp: they reduce their
consumption to a lower degree and they are still allowed to borrow to smooth consumption,
since they have previously accumulated relatively low levels of debt during the boom phase.
6.3 Welfare Cost of Naturalness
What is the overall welfare cost of being natural? The answer is not obvious, because, as
shown above, more natural agents that expect a long-lasting house price appreciation over-
borrow (and over-consume) during a housing price boom, but they need to reduce their con-
sumption more sharply during a housing price bust. Hence, we consider the whole boom-bust
episode (periods from 1 to 9) and compute the ex-post difference in utility (in consumption
equivalent terms) between a household that uses any process in the range 2-50 for computing
its housing price forecasts and the least natural household, which uses process 1 for forecast-
ing.34 In other words, such a measure corresponds to the percentage of consumption that an
agent would require in each period to equate the utility of the least natural agent. As Table
7 reports, the welfare cost (in percent) is monotonically increasing and large, since it reaches
a value of about 40 percent when agents make use of the least natural process. Intuitively,
although a more natural household enjoys higher consumption levels during the house price
boom, fuelled by higher debt, its deleveraging process during the bust phase is very costly in
33Such sharp dynamics in the deleveraging process may be due to the absence of frictions (e.g.. adjustment
costs) in lending: in case of an abrupt decline in collateral values, banks in our model suddenly cut-off lending.
However, note that in the above calibration in equilibrium the household never reaches the default region.
34We define as ex-post the realized utility of the agents in the 10 years of our simulation.
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utility terms. One might wonder what would be instead such welfare cost if measured ex-ante
(i.e. in the initial period t = 0) with agents entertaining different types of expectations. Not
surprisingly, results are reversed compared to the ex-post analysis: the higher the degree of
naturalness, the higher is the expected future housing wealth after a positive realisation of
the the house price shocks, and the higher is then the ex-ante lifetime expected utility; as a
result, the resulting ex-ante consumption equivalent is positive for higher degrees of natural-
ness. Intuitively, since a natural agent perceives the initial positive house price appreciation
to be very persistence and long-lasting, she overestimates her future housing wealth. This
effect increases the lifetime expected utility. However, the expectations about the house price
path soon reveal to be over-optimistic, and when the house price collapse, the natural agent
has to drastically adjust its consumption and debt paths. This effect leads to a large drop in
ex-post utility. Finally, notice that the whereas even an extremely natural agent feels better
off ex-ante because, the ex-post cost after the realisation of the boom-and-bust house price
episode is much larger.
6.4 The role of bank’s expectations
In section 2.1 we documented that financial experts are likely to have held natural expec-
tations during the housing price boom of the early 2000s, since their forecast do not show
any long-run mean reversion after the short-run momentum. Since our theoretical model
accounts for both the demand and supply of credit, we can now assess the impact of debt-
supply naturalness on macroeconomic variables of interest. Specifically, we now perform some
experiments to identify the contribution of banks’ and households’ expectations to the equi-
librium outcome of debt and interest rate under the following four competing hypotheses: (a)
both bank and household hold strong natural expectations; (b) bank and household do not
hold natural expectations; (c) only the household is strongly natural, while the bank is not;
(d) only the bank is strongly natural, while the household is not. In these experiments, for
simplicity, we give the natural label to an agent that forecasts future housing prices using
the most natural process (process 50), and we give the not-natural label to an agent that
forecasts future housing prices using the least natural process (process 1). These extreme val-
ues are vehicles for understanding the role of expectations in regards to supply and demand.
Table 8 displays the results. The most striking result of our experiment reflects the crucial
importance of banks’ expectations for the equilibrium level of debt. Let’s analyze first the
boom phase. When both agents are not natural, as in scenario (b), the equilibrium level of
debt in the economy is relatively low (around 35 percent of income). If we assume that only
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the household is natural, as in scenario (c), the equilibrium level of debt increases by only 5
percent, whereas if only the bank is natural, as in scenario (d), the equilibrium level of debt
increases up to 48 percent. In other words, without assuming a bank expectation channel, a
model in which only households are natural can only replicate a small portion of the leverage
level in the economy during the house price boom.
The importance of banks’ expectations can also be observed in the effect on the price of
debt, expressed as the interest rate. Consistent with standard economic theory, the scenario
in which only households are natural leads to an increase in the interest rate, and the scenario
in which only banks are natural leads to a decline in the interest rate. In fact, we can interpret
households’ increase in naturalness as an outward shift of the debt demand, since agents with
more natural expectations overestimate their future housing wealth, and are more willing to
obtain debt to smooth their consumption as a result. On the other hand, the scenario in which
only banks are natural is consistent with an outward shift of the supply. This is reinforced by
our result. When neither agent is natural, the equilibrium interest rate is 2.4 percent. When
only households are natural, the equilibrium interest rate rises to 3 percent (an indication in
a shift in demand for debt). When only banks are natural, the interest rate falls to 2 percent,
(an indication in a shift of supply of debt). When both agents - banks and households -
exhibit natural expectations, the equilibrium interest rate still falls, but to 2.1 percent.
Although data on banks’ charges for HELOC instruments are unavailable (because that
interest rate is usually privately agreed at subscription), Justiniano et al. (2014) document
the decline of mortgage rates during the housing price boom as evidence for the decline of
interest rate associated with home equity debt instruments. Whereas Justiniano et al. (2014)
explain this phenomenon with the relaxation of the lending constraint, the evidence provided
in section 2.1 and the results of our model propose an alternative story for the outward shift
in credit supply observed during the phase of rising housing prices.
6.5 Estimating Naturalness from the Data
Finally, we perform a comparison of our simulations with the debt-dynamics observed in
the data to pin down which degree of naturalness better fits the debt data. The first step is
to obtain a series that is comparable to the debt-to-income ratio as simulated in our model.
We first consider the annualized series of Gross Home Equity Extraction in the U.S., as in
Greenspan and Kennedy (2005).35 The series is available only until to 2008Q4. We divide the
35The series is the sum of (a) cash-outs resulting from refinancings, (b) originations to finance purchases
of existing homes minus sellers’ debt cancellation, and (c) changes in home equity debt outstanding less
unscheduled repayments on regular mortgage debt outstanding.
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series by nominal disposable personal income to compute the debt-to-income ratio. Because
the series is not directly comparable to the outcome of our simulated model, we need to correct
the former for the fraction of households effectively extracting home equity. Therefore, we
make use of the Survey of Consumer Finance data to compute the fraction of households with
an outstanding HELOC and interpolate via cubic splines for the years in which the survey
is not available. Such a percentage smoothly varies from 2.7 per cent in 2001 to 4.6 per
cent in 2008. We then compare the resulting debt-to-income series with the debt dynamics
of the model (where both household and bank can be natural) across the 50 specifications
and we select the process whose debt dynamics minimize the Euclidean distance with the
data. Figure 8 plots the selected process (black dotted line) and the debt-to-income ratio
in the data (blue solid line). The selected specification is the process 31, a fairly persistent
and natural one, since its second order autoregressive parameter is positive, θ2 = 0.08, and
its LRP is fairly large, equal to 3.15. Such an LRP is rather close to the one estimated on
yearly data with the intuitive model (se Table 9 in Appendix B). An interesting finding is
reported in Figure 9, where we plot, along with the debt dynamics observed in the data and
in the selected model, those that would arise under alternative assumptions on bank’s and
household’s expectations. More precisely, we plot the equilibrium debt that would arise if
banks had the least natural expectations (process 1) while households have expectations as
in process 31 (green circle-line), and if households had the least natural expectations (process
1) while banks have expectations as in process 31 (purple cross-line). These two scenarios
display the equilibrium debt-path that would realize if only one of the two agents displays
a certain degree of naturalaness. Finally we plot the outcome of the simulation with both
bank and household being least natural. It can be observed that in order to closely match
the data we need a significant degree of naturalness both on the household and on the bank
side.In fact, the model that features both natural banks and households can replicate quite
well the observed dynamics of HELOCs. In contrast, if only one of the two agents is natural
the model predicts a much lower degree of leverage in the economy than the one observed. 36
For comparison, in Figure 10 we plot the levels of debt and consumption arising under the
chosen model and we compare it with debt and consumption paths that one would get under
two extreme cases, assuming that agents are ”most natural” and ”least natural” (ie. taking
processes 50 and 1). It can be noted that the paths for debt and consumption up to period
4 for the selected model is very close to the most natural one. Then a deleveraging phase
36We also tried feeding alternatively the bank and the household with the most natural expectations, while
keeping the expectations of the other agent least natural. In both cases we are not able to match the data as
closely as we are able to do it assuming that the two agents are both endowed with expectations of process
31. The results of this experiment, not reported here for space optimization, are available upon request.
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occurs, less sharp than in the ”most natural” case: consumption falls, but not as much as in
the latter case. The reduction in consumption is however more significant than the one under
”least natural” expectations.
7 Conclusions
The recent financial crisis has served as a reminder of the potential danger caused by
undisciplined collateralized debt markets. In this paper, we use home equity extraction as a
case study to explore the distortions arising from natural expectations about future values of
collateral. We show that natural expectations arose during the period of the recent housing
price boom because of the failure of households and financial experts to take into account
the complex structure of house prices. We show that agents may end up overestimating long-
run prices if they make use of models that fail to capture the rich autocorrelation structure
of housing prices and its mean-reverting component. While the notion that households are
likely to misestimate house prices has been documented in the literature, in this paper we
provide evidence that financial experts also were too optimistic about long-run prices be-
fore and during the recent house price boom. Specifically, out-of-sample forecasts gathered
from a professional forecaster largely overestimated long-run prices and did not capture any
long-run mean reversion after the positive short-run momentum. We show the quantitative
implications of natural expectations in a model where households and banks interact through
a collateralized financial instrument. We feed the model with a set of expectations that differ
in their ability to capture hump-shaped housing price dynamics. We document that after a
positive shock on housing prices, less natural agents expect a lower persistence of the shock.
In contrast, natural agents overestimate the persistence of the process, thus leading to overly
optimistic long-run forecasts. We then simulate the model by considering housing price dy-
namics as observed during the 2000s. Our models predict a positive relationship between the
amount of home equity extracted in a boom phase and the degree of naturalness of the agents
in the credit market, while at the same time stressing the prominence of banks’ expectations
in the equilibrium outcome. A version of the model in which agents hold natural expecta-
tions seems to captures the dynamics of U.S. home equity extraction during the recent boom
and bust relatively well. Finally, we highlight that financial experts naturalness is a crucial
component for observing a large accumulation of debt at low interest rates.
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8 Tables
Forecast Horizon
2010 2015 2020 2030
Date of Forecast
1995 3.79 (3.3) 3.84 N.A. N.A.
1998 3.97 (2.2) 4.06 4.12 N.A.
2000 3.89 (1.6) 3.93 3.94 3.96
2002 4.16 (0.4) 4.10 4.07 4.04
2004 3.28 (-1.7) 3.21 3.16 3.17
2006 3.77 (-6.3) 3.40 3.22 3.11
Table 1 – Nominal Growth Forecasted House Price
Note: This table reports forecasted average housing price annualized growth rate by the professional forecaster company. The
first column reports the year in which the forecasts were made. Numbers in parenthesis are actual realized values of the housing
price growth rate.
Forecasts t+ q
q = 1 4 8 20 40 80
t =
1995 103.2 103.8 106.9 119.9 145.8 215.9
1998 100.9 102.8 106.7 119.5 146.5 223.1
2000 100.9 103.3 106.9 120.7 147.4 218.1
2002 100.4 102.8 107.8 121.7 136.9 219.2
2004 100.8 101.9 103.5 114.8 134.0 181.8
2006 100.8 103.5 106.6 116.2 133.9 179.5
Table 2 – Nominal Growth Forecasted House Price
Note: This table reports q-quarters ahead normalized forecasts by the professional forecast company made in the first quarter of
the year reported in the first column.
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Whole Sample: 1953:1-2010:4 Subsample: 1953:1-1996:4
Intuitive Finite memory BIC AIC Intuitive Finite memory BIC AIC
p 1 6 5 16 1 5 13 17
φ1 0.958∗∗∗
[0.02]
1.636∗∗∗
[0.10]
1.330∗∗∗
[0.06]
1.348∗∗∗
[0.07]
0.914∗∗∗
[0.00]
1.129∗∗∗
[0.10]
1.052∗∗∗
[0.08]
1.118∗∗∗
[0.08]
φ2 −0.581∗∗∗
[0.19]
−0.221∗∗
[0.10]
−0.241∗∗∗
[0.11]
−0.153
[0.14]
−0.024
[0.11]
−0.136
[0.13]
φ3 0.100
[0.19]
0.090
[0.10]
0.122
[0.12]
0.219
[0.14]
0.113
[0.11]
0.194
[0.12]
φ4 −0.789∗∗∗
[0.18]
−0.614∗∗∗
[0.10]
−0.841∗∗∗
[0.12]
−0.540∗∗∗
[0.14]
−0.695∗∗∗
[0.11]
−0.805∗∗∗
[0.12]
φ5 0.850∗∗∗
[0.19]
0.355∗∗∗
[0.06]
0.656∗∗∗
[0.12]
−0.245∗∗∗
[0.10]
−0.540∗∗∗
[0.12]
0.652∗∗∗
[0.14]
φ6 −0.259∗∗
[0.11]
0.012
[0.13]
0.077
[0.13]
0.004
[0.14]
φ7 −0.060
[0.13]
−0.073
[0.13]
−0.006
[0.14]
φ8 −0.457∗∗∗
[0.13]
−0.459∗∗∗
[0.13]
−0.562∗∗∗
[0.14]
φ9 0.346∗∗∗
[0.13]
0.425∗∗∗
[0.12]
0.485∗∗∗
[0.14]
φ10 0.055
[0.13]
0.049
[0.11]
0.013
[0.14]
φ11 0.121
[0.14]
0.039
[0.11]
0.148
[0.14]
φ12 −0.631∗∗∗
[0.13]
−0.467∗∗∗
[0.11]
−0.653∗∗∗
[014]
φ13 0.285∗∗
[0.12]
0.218∗∗∗
[0.08]
0.403∗∗
[0.14]
φ14 0.050
[0.13]
−0.118
[0.12]
φ15 0.136
[0.13]
0.211∗
[0.12]
φ16 −0.119
[0.08]
−0.291∗∗
[0.08]
φ17 0.105
[0.08]
Table 3 – Estimation of House Price Growth
Note: In this table we report the estimates of the autoregressive process in equation (1) when considering four models. The
intuitive expectations model assumes a first order autoregressive process. The finite memory assumes that the agents estimate
the model by using only the most recent 100 observations and select the order of the lag polynomial by considering the Bayesian
Information Criterion. The BIC and AIC models are estimated by maximizing the two different information criteria when using
observation from the whole sample (1953:1-2010:4) (left panel) and in the subsample (1953:1-1996:4) (right panel). The real
housing price is the annual growth rate of the Shiller index. Standard errors are in brackets. Significance at 1 percent is indicated
by ***, at 5 percent by **, at 10 percent by *.
Intuitive (p = 1) finite memory (p = 6) BIC (p = 5) AIC (p = 16)
RMSE 0.0148 0.0122 0.0122 0.0113
R2 0.9130 0.9713 0.9417 0.9531
R¯2 (adj.) 0.9126 0.9694 0.9404 0.9496
log-likelihood 636.58 682.90 681.14 700.72
p-value LR test (against AR1) 0.13 0.19
One period Ahead Forecast 1.96 2.63 2.33 2.34
Confidence Bands (95%) [1.90; 1.97] [2.31;2.82] [2.18; 2.44] [2.18; 2.48]
Long-Run Persistence (LRP) 23.7 24.4 18.7 10.4
Confidence Bands (95%) [10.3; 31.4] [6.4; 59.5] [8.6; 28.9] [5.1; 17.7]
Table 4 – In-Sample Fit and Forecasts
Note: The top panel of this table reports the in-sample fit statistics for the four models for model for housing prices (Intuitive
expectations, finite memory model, and for the model selected by the BIC and by AIC). The bottom panel reports statistics
regarding the properties of the models about the short-run forecasts and long-run forecasts.
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Process LRP θ1 θ2 σ
1 1.4 0.6 -0.31 0.041
10 1.93 0.6 -0.12 0.041
20 2.51 0.6 0.002 0.039
30 3.10 0.6 0.08 0.037
40 3.73 0.6 0.13 0.035
50 4.48 0.6 0.18 0.033
Table 5 – Calibration of some processes
Note: This table reports the long-run persistence (LRP), the two autoregressive parameters (θ1 and θ2) and the standard
deviation (σ) for six out of the 50 specifications of model as in (12).
Parameter Value Description
β=δ 0.98 Discount rate for household and banks
h 1.5 Housing stock
η 2 CRRA coefficient
y 1 Income per year
γ 0.05 Rental rate as a fraction of house value
κ 0.2 Collateral value for the bank as a fraction of house value
Table 6 – Calibration of structural parameters
Process 1 10 20 30 40 50
ex-post Consumption equivalent (%) 0 -3 -7.1 -14.6 -25.9 -39.4
ex-ante Consumption equivalent (%) 0 0.5 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.5
Table 7 – Consumption Equivalent throughout the cycle and ex-ante welfare
Note: This table reports the ex-ante and ex-post welfare cost in terms of consumption equivalent (in percent) of being natural.
Welfare is computed as the percentage of consumption in every period that an agent that uses any process (2-50) to forecast
future housing prices in the model requires to instead be endowed with beliefs described by the least natural process (process 1).
The ex-post utility is computed as realised utility after the realisations of the 10-periods house price path. The ex-ante utility is
computed as expected utility at time t = 1.
Boom Bust
Debt Rate Debt Rate
a) Bank and Household natural 54.5 2.2 0.0 -
b) None natural 35.0 2.5 13.9 2.0
c) Only Household natural 36.2 2.8 9.2 2.1
d) Only Bank natural 42.2 2.1 5.1 2.0
Table 8 – Debt dynamics under different assumptions
Note: This table reports the simulated average level of debt and interest rate across the boom phase (left panel, from period 1
to period 6 in our model, which correspond to the period 2000-2006) and bust phase (right panel, from period 1 to period 6 in
our model, which correspond to the period 2000-2006 in the data) under the hypothesis that both the bank and household are
natural (a), both bank and household are not natural (b), only the household is natural (c), and only the bank is natural (d). In
this exercise, for simplicity, we assume that a natural agent uses process 50 to make forecasts, whereas a non natural agent uses
process 1.
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9 Figures
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Figure 1 – Home equity extraction and house prices in the U.S.
Note: This figure displays the flows of home equity extraction (solid blue line, left scale) in the U.S. in billion of dollars
along with the Shiller’ Real Home Price Index (dashed green line, right scale). Home equity extraction is computed as a
four quarters moving average of Gross Equity Extraction divided by the Consumer Price Index. The series, computed ac-
cording to the methodology in Greenspan and Kennedy (2005), is available at http://www.calculatedriskblog.com/2009/03/
q4-mortgage-equity-extraction-strongly.html (retrieved 7 August 2014). The Real Home Price Index is available at the
Robert Shiller’s website (http://www.econ.yale.edu/~shiller/data.htm, retrieved 7 August 2014).
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Figure 2 – Financial Expert’s Forecasts
Note: This figure displays the realized evolution of the house price index (solid black line) along with the financial expert forecasts
made in different points in time. The four forecasts in the figure were made in 2000Q1 (red dotted line), in 2002Q1 (green circled
line ), in 2004Q1 (purple dashed line) and in 2006Q1 (blue dash-dotted line)
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Figure 3 – Real U.S. Shiller House Price index
Note: This figure plots the Standard & Poor’s Case-Shiller Home Price Index U.S. real housing price index in its level (upper
panel) and growth rate (lower panel).
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Figure 4 – Comparison of Impulse Response Functions
Note: This figure reports the impulse response function (IRF) of housing price growth rate (upper panel) and housing price
level (lower panel) to a positive unitary shock. The solid blue line represents the IRF implied by agents that estimate an AR(1)
process for the housing price growth rate (intuitive model). The solid-dotted purple line represents the IRF implied by an agents
that estimate a process for the housing price growth rate when using only the last 100 observations (finite memory model). The
dotted red line represents the IRF for an agent that maximizes the Bayesian Information Criterion and, hence, estimates an
AR(5) process for the housing price growth rate. The green dashed line represent the IRF for an agent that maximizes the
Akaike Information Criterion and, hence, estimates an AR(16) process for the housing price growth rate.
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Figure 5 – Simulated house price dynamics
Note: This figure plots the housing price series fed into the model (black solid line) along with the actual realization of the
annualized Shiller index from 2001 to 2010 (dotted line). The Shiller index has been rescaled and set equal to 1 in 2004.
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Figure 6 – IRFs and CIRFs for selected processes
Note: This figure plots the impulse response functions for the housing price growth rate (top-panel) and level (bottom panel) for
three different processes used to solve the model: the one characterizing the most natural agents (green-triangle line), the AR1
model (blue-star line), and the one characterizing the least natural agents (black-solid line).
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Figure 7 – Boom and bust dynamics for selected processes
Note: This figure displays the average values of debt-to-income (upper left panel), LTV ratio (upper right panel), consumption-
to-income (lower left panel) and interest rate (lower right panel) for each of the fifty specifications of expected house price growth.
The values displayed in the figure have been interpolated by a 3rd degree polynomial. The x-axis reports the number of each
process, from the least (process 1) to the most (process 50) natural. Average values are computed both across the boom phase
(from period 1 to period 6 in our model, which correspond to the period 2000-2006 in the data, blue solid line) and across the
bust (from period 7 to period 9 in our model, which corresponds to the period 2007-2009 in the data, green dashed line).
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Figure 8 – Actual v. simulated data
Note: The black solid line in this figure displays the ratio of gross Home Equity Extraction over Personal Disposable Income,
weighted by the fraction of households with an active HELOC (source: Survey of Consumer Finance). The series is normalized
at 0 in 2000. The blue crossed line is the simulated debt path arising from process 31, which is the process that minimize the
Euclidian distance between the data and the dynamics of debt predicted by our model when varying the degree of naturalness of
the agents (process 1 to 50). Sources: Greenspan and Kennedy (2005), FRED, Federal Reserve Economic Data, Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis and SCF.
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Figure 9 – Debt dynamics under various assumptions on expec-
tations
Note: The black solid line in this figure displays the ratio of gross Home Equity Extraction over Personal Disposable Income,
weighted by the fraction of households with an active HELOC (source: Survey of Consumer Finance). The series is normalized
at 0 in 2000. The red-dashed line is the simulated debt path arising from both agents having expectations as in process 31,
which is the process that minimize the Euclidian distance between the data and the dynamics of debt predicted by our model
when varying the degree of naturalness of the agents (process 1 to 50). The blue-circle line represents the debt dynamics under
the assumption that only the bank is natural (process 31) but the household is not natural (process 1). The green-circled line
represents the debt dynamics under the assumption that only the household is natural (process 31) but the bank is not natural
(process 1). Finally the purple-cross line represents the debt dynamics under the assumption that both bank and household are
not natural. Sources for the data: Greenspan and Kennedy (2005), FRED, Federal Reserve Economic Data, Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis and SCF.
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Figure 10 – Actual v. simulated data
Note: The blue solid line in this figures represents the levels of debt and consumption arising from process 31, which is the
process that minimize the Euclidian distance between the data and the dynamics of debt predicted by our model when varying
the degree of naturalness of the agents (process 1 to 50). The green and red dotted lines are respectively the levels of debt and
consumption arising under process 50 (most natural) and 1 (least natural).
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A Appendix: Confidence Band Impulse Response House
Price
The top panel of Figure 11 plots together the level impulse response of the intuitive model
(blue solid line) and the AIC model (green dotted line) and their 95 percent confidence band
(shaded area); the central panel plots together the level impulse response of the intuitive model
(blue solid line) and the BIC model (red dashed line) and their 95 percent confidence band;
and the bottom panel plots together the level impulse response of the intuitive model (blue
solid line) and the finite memory model (purple circled line) and their 95 percent confidence
band. As expected, the uncertainty around the impulse responses is large and the confidence
bands largely overlap.
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Figure 11 – Impulse Response Functions with confidence bands
Note: This figure reports the cumulative impulse response function (CIRF) of house price growth rate to a positive unitary shock.
Shaded areas represent the 95 per cent confidence intervals. Top panel: intuitive model (blue solid line) and AIC model (green
dotted line). Central panel: intuitive model (blue solid line) and BIC model (red dashed line). Bottom panel: intuitive model
(blue solid line) and finite memory model (purple circled line).
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B Appendix: Long-Run Price for Annual Data
Natural BIC AIC Short Memory
p 1 6 7 2
Long-Run Persistence (LRP) 2.76 1.72 1.52 2.29
Confidence Bands (95%) [2.17;4.49] [0.85;3.05] [0.67; 2.91] [0.25; 5.17]
Table 9 – LRP and Confidence Band
C Appendix: Numerical algorithm
The numerical algorithm for solving the model works as follows:
1. create a grid for debt and interest rate and assign values to parameters (β, h, η, y, γ, κ, {it}T−1t=0 ).
2. Define the true house price process {pt}Tt=0 and the ones perceived by the agents:{
pHt
}T
t=0
for household and
{
pBt
}T
t=0
for bank. Use Tauchen (1986)’s method for dis-
cretizing the shock and create a grid for debt and interest rate.
3. Start from period T and compute terminal value for both bank and household. For each
value of the housing shock compute value function for household V ∗T (rT−1, dT−1, pT ) and
bank piT (rT−1, dT−1, pT ). More precisely, in order to recover V ∗T (rT−1, dT−1, pT ), we need
to compute the default decision from the point of view of the household, while in order
to recover piT (rT−1, dT−1, pT )we need to compute the default decision from the point
of view of the bank. This is obtained by inserting the expectations of the bank into
the household problem and solving it. More concisely, for each rT−1, dT−1 and pT , the
default decision is as follows:
default in T =

1 if pBT ≤ (1+rT−1)dT−1γh
0 otherwise
4. Go back to period T − 1. From now on, the algorithm is valid for periods from t =
T − 1, ..., 1. Fix an interest rate r˜t and for each value of the housing shock compute the
value function V ∗t (rt−1, dt−1, pt) and the debt demand schedule d
H
t (r˜t).
5. Feed the bank’s problem with the value of dHt and find the value of r
B
t that satisfies the
value function of the bank.
46
6. If rBt = rt then stop and move to period t− 1, otherwise, replace rt with rBt and repeat
the loop from 2 until convergence.
7. Given r1, d1 and expectations over the realization of p1, compute the equilibrium values
of d0 and r0.
47
